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Jones: It's All in the Timing: Rethinking Remand of Supplemental Claims

IT'S ALL IN THE TIMING:
RETHINKING REMAND OF SUPPLEMENTAL
CLAIMS TO PRESERVE COURT RESOURCES
The necessary ingredients of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee that no one shall be deprived of liberty without Due
Process of law include a right to be heard and to offer
testimony: "A person's .. right to his day in court [is] basic
in our system ofjurisprudence."l
I.

INTRODUCTION

Lance Raygor was denied employment at the local university
because of his age, and he wanted to assert an age discrimination claim
2
under both the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
4
3
("ADEA") and the state Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA").

2

Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)).
29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers
find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain
employment, and especially to regain employment when
displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain
otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of
older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term
unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and
employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high
among older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and
their employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary
discrimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce
and the free flow of goods in commerce.
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age
on employment.

Id.
3
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.13 (West 1991).
4
This illustration is based on Raygor v. Regents of University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533
(2002), to demonstrate the procedural injustice of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), which provides the
judicial discretion to dismiss supplemental claims at any time in a suit. This injustice is
illustrated in Part III of this Note, and a revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)-(d) is proposed in
Part IV of this Note.

1459
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 [2004], Art. 6

1460

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 38

After assessing the various jurisdiction alternatives, Raygor's attorneys
advised him that he could either: (1) file the claims in federal court; (2)
file the claims in state court; or (3) file the ADEA claim in federal court
and the MHRA claim in state court.5 Raygor chose to file both claims in
the federal district court, which had jurisdiction over the MIRA claim
6
under supplemental jurisdiction.
After a substantial amount of pretrial proceedings, the ADEA claim
was dismissed. 7 Since Raygor's anchor claim was dismissed and the
federal court did not have original jurisdiction to hear his MHRA claim,
the court exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and
dismissed the MHRA claim.8 To add insult to Raygor's injury, the state
statute of limitations tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) does not
apply to claims asserted against States, and thus, Raygor could not assert
his MHRA claim in the state court at this time. 9 Therefore, Raygor did
not have an alternate forum to have his state discrimination claim heard.
Raygor fell victim to a jurisdictional technical knock-out ("TKO").
Plaintiffs that have both a federal and state cause of action against a
State, and choose to file their claims in federal court, take the substantial
risk that a judge will exercise her discretion and leave them without a
forum -depriving the plaintiffs of their day in court.' 0 This Note will
address the discretion that § 1367(c) provides district court judges and
how the timing of this inquiry affects the presumption of whether a
federal court should maintain supplemental jurisdiction."
Part II of this Note discusses how the Supreme Court of the United
States interpreted its authority to grant jurisdiction prior to the
supplemental jurisdiction statute. 2 The reasons that Congress passed
the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and the current

5
6

See infra note 233.
Raygor, 534 U.S. at 537.

7

Id. In 1996, Raygor first filed his claims in federal court, but in 1997, Raygor's ADEA

claim was stayed pending the Supreme Court's holding in Kirnel v. Florida Board of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000). Id. The Court in Kimel held that the "ADEA does not validly abrogate
the states' sovereign immunity." 528 U.S. at 92. Raygor's ADEA claim was subsequently
dismissed, Raygor, 534 U.S. at 537.
8
Id. at 545.
9
Id. at 546.
10 See, e.g., id. at 547; Costello v. Mass. Rehab. Comm'n, 982 F. Supp. 61 (D. Mass. 1997)
(using § 1367(c)(3) to dismiss supplemental claims after dismissal of federal claims).
11 See infa Part III.B-C.
12 See infra Part II.
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state of § 1367 law are also discussed. 13 Part III analyzes how the timing
of the discretionary analysis authorized by § 1367(c) affects the
presumption of whether a court should maintain supplemental
jurisdiction. 14 Part III also discusses the reason that § 1367(d) should be
revised so that it provides a tolling of the statute of limitations to all
claims granted by § 1367(a).1 5 In order to address the shortcomings of
§ 1367(c)-(d), this Note proposes a revision in Part IV that will take into
16
consideration the timing of the dismissal.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND: SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS

This Part discusses the two ways that litigants can get into federal
court: federal question or diversity. 17 Once a litigant has a valid
"anchor" claim in federal court, there are occasions when the district
court should allow other claims to be heard along with the anchor
claim.' 8 Before Finley v. United States,19 these claims were referred to as
pendent and ancillary. 20 After Finley, Congress attempted to codify these
principles by authorizing the court to hear these claims under the
21
supplemental jurisdiction statute.
A. Limited Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over claims for which both
authorization exists. 22
The
constitutional and congressional

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
15 See infra Part III.
16
See infra Part IV.
17
See infra Part II.A.
18 See infra Part II.B.
490 U.S. 545 (1989); see infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
19
20 See infra Part II.B.
Pendent and ancillary jurisdiction were doctrines that would allow
state-law claims to be joined to the anchor claim when there was a "common nucleus of
operative fact," and Congress had not negated the existence of such an exercise of
jurisdiction. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
21
See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat.
4642 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); infra Part II.C.
22 Finley, 490 U.S. at 548.
[A]Il courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal, two things are
necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The
Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of
To the extent that such action is not
Congress must have supplied it....
taken, the power lies dormant.
13
14
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constitutional authority from which federal judicial power extends is
found in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. 23 Federal
question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction are the two most common
constitutional categories of subject matter jurisdiction. 24
Congress granted the federal courts federal question jurisdiction
over claims "arising under" the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties
by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1331.25 The question whether a claim arises
under federal law must be determined by reference to the "well-pleaded
complaint." 26 A defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to
confer federal jurisdiction.27 The federal cause of action must appear on
28
the face of the claim.

Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868) (emphasis added).
23 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
1. Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 provides that:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; -to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; - to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;- to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States; - between a State and citizens of another State;between Citizens of different States; - between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
24 See infra notes 25-28, 33-39 and accompanying text.
25 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). This path requires the plaintiff to establish a cause of action
based in federal law. Id.; Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)
(holding that to invoke federal question jurisdiction, the cause of action must arise under
federal law).
26 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983). "[T]he
phrase 'arising under' masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and
state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system." Id. at 8.
27 Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152. The Mottley rule requires that the eligibility of a case for
statutory federal-question jurisdiction-either originally under § 1331 or by removal under
§1441(a)-be determined by reference only to the well-pleaded allegations of the
complaint, without consideration of the defendant's pleadings. Id. at 152-54. This control
rationale seems to be the only one that the Supreme Court articulated in the early cases
from which the modern rule has developed. Jenkins v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 650 F.
Supp. 609, 613-15 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (discussing turn-of-the-century Supreme Court cases).
28 Blair v. Source One Mortgage Servs. Corp., 925 F. Supp. 617, 620 (D. Minn. 1996)
(quoting M. Nahas & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Hot Springs, 930 F.2d 608, 612 (8th Cir.
1991)). "However, there is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule: 'a plaintiff
cannot thwart the removal of a case by inadvertently, mistakenly or fraudulently
concealing the federal question that would necessarily have appeared if the complaint had
been well pleaded."' Id.
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But even a federal issue in a well-pleaded complaint may not be
enough to allow federal question jurisdiction. 29 There are two ways to
apply federal question jurisdiction. First, in the vast majority of federal
question cases, federal law creates the cause of action. 30 Second, federal
question jurisdiction may arise in cases where the "relief depends upon
the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and that such federal claim is not merely colorable, and rests
upon a reasonable foundation." 31 However, if a complaint alleges a
violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action, and
Congress did not create a private cause of action for the federal statute,
32
then the claim does not create a federal question.
In addition to federal question jurisdiction, federal courts can hear
33
claims between citizens of different states under diversity jurisdiction.
Congress granted the federal courts diversity jurisdiction by enacting 28
35
U.S.C. § 1332. 34 The diversity jurisdiction statute has two elements.

29 See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (holding that since
Congress did not intend for a private cause of action, the fact that the interpretation of a
federal statute as an element of a state cause of action did not create a claim "arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States").
30 Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8-9. The "vast majority" of cases that come within this
grant of jurisdiction are covered by Justice Holmes' statement that a "suit arises under the
law that creates the cause of action." Id. (quoting Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler
Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)). Although it is not used as such, the Holmes test was meant to
be a device for exclusion. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) ("It has
come to be realized that Mr. Justice Holmes' formula is more useful for inclusion than for
the exclusion for which it was intended.").
31 Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921).
32 Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 817; see also Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co., 291
U.S. 205, 216-17 (1934) (emphasizing that the violation of the federal standard as an element
of state tort recovery did not fundamentally change the state tort nature of the action). But
see Smith, 255 U.S. at 201 ("It is ... apparent that the controversy concerns the constitutional
validity ... drawn in question. The decision depends upon the determination of this
issue.").
33 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000); see also Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("It was believed that, consciously or otherwise, the courts of a
state may favor their own citizens. Bias against outsiders may become embedded in a
judgment of a state court and yet not be sufficiently apparent to be made the basis of a
federal claim.").
34 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Congressional authorization for diversity jurisdiction provides that:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between(1)
(2)

citizens of different States;
citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
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First, diversity jurisdiction has been interpreted to require complete
diversity. 36 Complete diversity requires that plaintiffs be domiciled in
different states from all of the defendants. 37 Second, jurisdiction based
on diversity requires that the plaintiffs meet the statutorily mandated
amount in controversy of $75,000.00. 39 Any claim that does not meet
39
either of these requirements must be dismissed.
Federal courts first received the power to hear claims asserted under
diversity jurisdiction from the Judiciary Act of 1789.40 In 1809, Chief
Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court of the United States explained that
diversity jurisdiction was needed for fairness between litigants of
different states, and thus, federal diversity jurisdiction has remained
firmly rooted in common law for over two-hundred years. 41 Hence,

(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or
of a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
For the purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441,
admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be
a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.

subjects
title, as
an alien
deemed

Id.
35 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
36 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)-(4). It is important to note that the United States Constitution
requires only minimal diversity-where at least one plaintiff has a citizenship status
different than at least one defendant. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).
37 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 U.S. (1 Cranch) 267 (1806) (mem.).
3
Congress limited diversity jurisdiction by increasing the amount-in-controversy
requirement to $75,000 in the 1996 Amendments. Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205(a)(1) (1996).
See supra note 34 for the text of § 1332.
39 Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding that all members of a class
must individually meet the statutory amount in controversy requirement of § 1332).
40 Id. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the lower federal courts jurisdiction over "all suits
of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive
of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and ... the suit is between a citizen of
the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch.
20, §§ 11, 12, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
41 See Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). Chief Justice
Marshall explained:
However, true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of
every description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either
entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such
indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has
established national tribunals for the decisions of controversies
between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different states.
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diversity jurisdiction exists to provide access to impartial tribunals for
out-of-state residents who fear bias in state courts.42 In 1948, Congress
passed § 1332 to authorize federal courts to hear suits based on
diversity. 43 Congress' purpose in passing § 1332 was to limit the
diversity caseload of the federal courts." To effectuate this objective,
courts have developed rules governing the complete diversity and the
amount-in-controversy requirements, which further limit federal
45
jurisdiction.
These rules have played a major role in shaping the diversity class
actions in federal courts.4 6 The complete diversity requirement is relaxed
in class actions so that only the named representative of the class needs

See supra note 33.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969) (stating that the purpose of the diversity
jurisdictional amount is to remove from federal courts claims that are insubstantial in
character and to avoid encroaching on the jurisdiction of the state courts); see Lorraine
Motors, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 F. Supp. 319 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) (stating that the
purpose of the amount-in-controversy requirement is to prevent the dockets of federal
courts from being overcrowded with small cases that should be brought in state courts); see
also Pierson v. Source Perrier, S.A., 848 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that the
congressional purpose behind the amount-in-controversy requirement is to keep the
caseload of federal courts under some modicum of control); Brown v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Tr.
& Sav. Ass'n, 281 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ill. 1%8).
45
Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 292 (1973). In Zahn, the plaintiffs, citizens of
Vermont, were owners of Lake Champlain front property that had been damaged by the
polluted waters of the lake. Id. The landowners sought damages from International Paper
Company, a New York corporation, who allegedly permitted discharge from its pulp and
paper plant to flow into a creek that shared a stream with Lake Champlain. Id. The suit
was a class action, governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states in pertinent part:
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis added). The claim of the named plaintiff exceeded the
jurisdictional amount in controversy. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 292 (stating that in 1973, the
statutory amount-in-controversy for diversity jurisdiction was $10,000). However, not
every individual member of the class suffered pollution damages that exceeded the amount
in controversy. Id.
46
See supra notes 44-45.
42

43
44

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 [2004], Art. 6

1466

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.38

to be diverse from the defendants. 47 The Court found the need for this
exception to the complete diversity requirement because of the difficulty
of obtaining complete diversity in large class actions with plaintiffs from
every state.48 However, the amount-in-controversy requirement was not
relaxed for members of a diversity class action. 49 In Zahn v. International
Paper Co.,50 the Court held that each member of the class had to
individually meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.5' Failure to
52
do so required dismissal of that member's claim from federal court.
However, in a dissenting opinion, Justices Douglas and Marshall joined
Justice Brennan in stating that the claims of all the class members should
be allowed in fairness to the litigant and in the interest of judicial
economy.5 3 Thus, federal question and diversity jurisdiction have
provided litigants a way to have their claims litigated in federal courts,
and the Supreme Court has determined the boundaries of those
legislative grants in jurisdiction. 54
Once an anchor claim is properly in federal court, there are many
instances where it is in the interests of the parties and judicial economy if
additional claims are heard within the same case.55 However, federal
courts must have the power to hear the additional claims.5 6 Recognizing

47
See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921) (holding that only
the named representative of the class needs to be diverse from the defendants to get
diversity jurisdiction).
48 Id.
49
Zahn, 414 U.S. at 294. The Court held that "[w]hen two or more plaintiffs, having
separate and distinct demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is
essential that the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount." Id. (quoting
Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehad & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911)).
50 414 U.S. 291.
51

Id.

Id. The Zahn rule plainly mandates "that the entire case must be dismissed where
none of the plaintiffs claims more than $10,000 [now $75,000] but also requires that any
plaintiff without the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from the case, even though
others allege jurisdictionally sufficient claims." Id. at 300. However, dismissal is necessary
only if there is no other independent basis for maintaining original jurisdiction. Romero v.
Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 381 (1959).
53 Zahn, 414 U.S. at 308 ("[Dlenial of ancillary jurisdiction will impose a much larger
burden on the state and federal judiciary as a whole, and will substantially impair the
ability of the prospective class members to assert their claims."). The claims of all of the
class members, when the named representative meets the § 1332 requirements, should be
allowed to avoid the "redundant litigation of the common issues.., the cost to the litigants
and the drain on the resources of the judiciary." Id.
54 See supra notes 44-45.
55 See infra Part II.B.
56 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
52
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the need to resolve this issue, the Supreme Court developed the
57
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
B.

Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction

The origins of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction can be traced back
to Osborn v. Bank of the United States,58 where the Court held that the
Constitution authorized the exercise of federal question jurisdiction over
non-federal questions of law or fact in a case arising under the laws of
the United States.59 From the holding in Osborn, the Court developed the
common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. 60 Pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction developed in response to a need for judicial
economy and efficiency. 61 This goal was best served by allowing the
joinder and adjudication of certain claims that relied on a common
nucleus of facts, but that would not otherwise have an independent basis
62
for federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Pendent jurisdiction existed whenever there was a federal question
properly before the federal court and the litigants wanted to add a state-

57 See generally Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (narrowing the application of
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365
(1978) (placing limits on ancillary jurisdiction); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976)
(holding that a grant of jurisdiction over claims involving particular parties does not itself
confer jurisdiction over additional claims by or against different parties); United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (announcing a three-part test for pendent
jurisdiction).
58 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (mer.).
59 Id. at 823. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution authorizes the exercise of
federal jurisdiction over a case arising under the laws of the United States even though the
case presents other nonfederal questions. Id. Chief Justice Marshall declared:
[Wjhen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is
extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause,
it is in the power of the Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction
of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be
involved in it.
Id.
60 See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 370 (noting that pendent and ancillary jurisdiction "are two
species of the same generic problem: Under what circumstances may a federal court hear
and decide a state-law claim arising between citizens of the same State?"); Aldinger, 427
U.S. at 13 (stating that "there is little profit in attempting to decide, for example, whether
there are any 'principled' differences between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction").
61 Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 13.
62 Osborn, 22 U.S. at 738. Dating back to 1824, the first exercise of pendent jurisdiction is
attributed to Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn. Id. Ancillary jurisdiction is traced at least as
far back as Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
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63
law claim to the suit before the commencement of the law suit.
Ancillary jurisdiction existed whenever there was either a federal
question or diversity claim properly before the federal court and the
litigants wanted to add a state-law claim after the law suit had begun. 64
The exercise of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction had to satisfy a twostep test.65 First, the federal and nonfederal claims had to arise from a
"common nucleus of operative fact." 66 If the court was satisfied that the
claims met this minimum test of relatedness, the court could then
exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claim only if it found that
"Congress in the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by
67
implication negated its existence."

1.

Pendent Jurisdiction

Courts have traditionally divided the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction into two parts: pendent claim jurisdiction and pendent party
jurisdiction. 68 Pendent claim jurisdiction exists whenever there is a

See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.2.
65
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
66
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978) (applying test to the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction); Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 (applying test to pendent
jurisdiction).
67
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976). Aldinger limited this inquiry to the exercise
of pendent party jurisdiction. Id. However, the Supreme Court eventually applied this test
to the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in Kroger:
The Aldinger and Zahn cases thus make clear that a finding that federal
and nonfederal claims arise from a "common nucleus of operative
fact," the test of Gibbs, does not end the inquiry into whether a federal
court has power to hear the nonfederal claims along with the federal
ones.
Beyond this constitutional minimum, there must be an
examination of the posture in which the nonfederal claim is asserted
and of the specific statute that confers jurisdiction over the federal
claim, in order to determine whether "Congress in [that statute] has...
expressly or by implication negated" the exercise of jurisdiction over
the particular nonfederal claim.
437 U.S. at 373 (quoting Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18) (alteration in original).
68
The doctrine of pendent claim jurisdiction has its origin in two cases: Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909), and Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). In
Siler, the Court held that whenever federal jurisdiction was based on a "colorable" federal
question, the lower court "had the right to decide all the questions in the case, even though
it decided the Federal questions adversely to the party raising them, or even if it omitted to
decide them at all, but decided the case on local or state questions only." 213 U.S. at 191.
In Hurn, the Supreme Court answered the question as to what extent did the state law
claim need to be related to the federal claim to permit the exercise of pendent claim
jurisdiction. 289 U.S. at 246-47. The Court held that a federal court may exercise
63

64
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federal question and the relationship between that claim and a state-law
claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court
comprises but one constitutional "case." 69 Pendent party jurisdiction
expands the scope of pendent jurisdiction by allowing a plaintiff to add
in the original complaint a related state law claim against an additional
defendant when the plaintiff's original federal claim is based on a federal
question.70 In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,71 the Supreme Court
72
established the inquiry for pendent claim jurisdiction.

jurisdiction over claims for which no independent basis of jurisdiction exists only if the
federal and state-law claims form a single cause of action. Id. However, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure abandoned the "cause of action" terminology in favor of a liberal joinder
policy. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724 (noting the confusion caused by the Hurn cause of action test).
69 Id. at 725.
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever
there is a claim "arising under" [the] Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority, ... and the relationship between that claim and the state
claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court
comprises but one constitutional "case." The federal claim must have
substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.
The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or
state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming
substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to
hear the whole.
Id. (citations omitted).
70 Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 1 (restricting the scope of pendent party jurisdiction). The Court
in Aldinger, emphasized the well-established principle that federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction and held that before a federal court may exercise pendent party
jurisdiction, it must "satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but that Congress in the
statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its existence."
Id. at 18. The Court noted that although the facts in Aldinger and the pendent claim in Gibbs
served the same considerations of judicial economy, there was something significantly
different about a pendent party claim:
The situation with respect to the joining of a new party, however,
strikes us as being both factually and legally different from the
situation facing the Court in Gibbs and its predecessors. From a purely
factual point of view, it is one thing to authorize two parties, already
present in federal court by virtue of a case over which the court has
jurisdiction, to litigate in addition to their federal claim a state-law
claim over which there is no independent basis of federal jurisdiction.
But it is quite another thing to permit a plaintiff, who has asserted a
claim against one defendant with respect to which there is federal
jurisdiction, to join an entirely different defendant on the basis of a
state-law claim over which there is no independent basis of federal
jurisdiction, simply because his claim against the first defendant and
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In Gibbs, the Court held that pendent claim jurisdiction might be
exercised whenever the relationship between the federal question and
the state-law claim "permits the conclusion that the entire action before
The Court
the court comprises but one constitutional 'case."' 73
announced a three-part test for pendent claim jurisdiction: (1) the
federal claim must have sufficient substance to confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the court; (2) the state and federal claims must derive
from a common nucleus of operative fact; and (3) the claims must be
such that they would ordinarily be brought together in one judicial
proceeding. 74
In dicta, the Court noted that the reasons for allowing pendent
jurisdiction were judicial economy, fairness, and convenience to
litigants. 75 In addition, the Court stated that if these factors were absent
in a given case, a court had discretion to decline to exercise pendent
jurisdiction, and it provided examples of other considerations and
situations in which pendent jurisdiction may be allowed. 76 Even though

his claim against the second defendant "derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact."
Id. at 14 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725).
71 383 U.S. 715.
72 Id. at 725; see supra note 69.
73 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. The Court emphasized that under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, "the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action
consistent with fairness to the parties [and that] joinder of claims, parties and remedies is
strongly encouraged." Id. at 724.
74 Id. at 725.
75 Id. According to Judge Posner in Sarnoffv. American Home Products Corp., "[a] dictum
is a statement in a judicial opinion that could have been deleted without seriously
impairing the analytical foundations of the holding that, being peripheral, may not have
received the full and careful consideration of the court that uttered it." 798 F.2d 1075, 1084
(7th Cir. 1986).
76 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27.
[Jiustification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience
and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should
hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound
to apply state law to them. Needless decisions of state law should be
avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the
parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable
law. Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even
though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims
should be dismissed as well. Similarly, if it appears that the state
issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the
scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy
sought, the state claims may be dismissed without prejudice and left
for resolution to state tribunals. There may, on the other hand, be
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this discretionary analysis was dicta, district courts have used this
portion of the Gibbs opinion at every stage of litigation to evaluate the
exercise of jurisdiction. 77
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of pendent party jurisdiction
in Aldinger v. Howard.78 In Aldinger, the plaintiff claimed federal
jurisdiction over a § 198379 claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) 80 and
claimed pendent jurisdiction over the state claims. 81 The Court refused
because it would undermine another federal statute (namely, § 1983 as
then interpreted) to permit pendent party jurisdiction, but limited its
holding to claims brought under §§ 1983 and 1343(a)(3), stating that
other claims might call for a different result. 82 After Aldinger, federal
courts have to show not only that Article III of the United States
Constitution permitted jurisdiction, but that Congress in the statutes
conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its

situations in which the state claim is so closely tied to questions of
federal policy that the argument for exercise of pendent jurisdiction is
particularly strong.
Id. (citations omitted).
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988) (affirming the use of the Gibbs
balancing test at every stage of litigation to evaluate the exercise of jurisdiction). "Under
Gibbs, a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the
litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to
decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent
state-law claims." Id. at 350.
78 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing a civil action in federal courts for deprivation of
rights).
80 28 U.S.C § 1343(a)(3) (1974).
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person: ... (3) To redress
the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of
Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.
81 Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 4 (1976). Aldinger was unable to assert a federal
claim against the county, since, at the time, courts had interpreted § 1983 as not extending
to municipal corporations. Id. This construction was overruled two years after Aldinger in
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 683-88 (1978). Denis F. McLaughlin, The
Federal Supplemental JurisdictionStatute -A Constitutionaland Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 849, 883 (1992). In addition, no diversity jurisdiction existed "because both the plaintiff
and the county were citizens of Washington." Id.
82 Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18.
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existence.8 3 Because of the limitations that Aldinger placed on pendent
party jurisdiction, litigants turned to ancillary jurisdiction to join
additional parties. 84
2.

Ancillary Jurisdiction

Unlike pendent jurisdiction, ancillary jurisdiction authorizes the
exercise of jurisdiction over a related state-law claim after the
commencement of the lawsuit, even if the anchor claim is based on
diversity jurisdiction.85 However, this authorization is a narrow one. In
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,8 6 the Supreme Court held that
when a plaintiff's anchor claim is based on diversity, the plaintiff may
not assert additional state-law claims against non-diverse third-party
defendants.8 7 Therefore, the Court refused to allow the exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction of the plaintiff's claim against a non-diverse thirdparty defendant, reasoning that the exercise of jurisdiction over such a
claim would allow plaintiffs to circumvent the complete diversity
requirement of § 1332.88

93

Id.
See infra Part II.B.2.
"[Alncillary
85 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978).
jurisdiction typically involves claims by a defending party haled into court against his will,
or by another person whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert them in
an ongoing action in a federal court." Id.
86 437 U.S. 365.
87 Id. at 377. The plaintiff in Kroger, a citizen of Iowa, brought a claim based on state law
in the federal district court against the Omaha Public Power District ("OPPD"), a Nebraska
corporation. Id. at 365. OPPD then impleaded Owen Equipment and Erection Corporation,
a citizen of both Iowa and Nebraska, pursuant to FRCP 14. Id. Rule 14 allows a defendant,
as a third-party plaintiff, to assert a claim for indemnity against "a person not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against the third-party plaintiff." FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a). The plaintiff filed an amended
complaint naming Owen as an additional defendant even though there was no
independent basis of federal jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim because the complete
diversity requirement was no longer met. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 377. Complete diversity was
destroyed because the plaintiff and Owen were citizens of the same state, Iowa. Id.
88 Id. at 374-77. The Court stated that:
[N]either the convenience of litigants nor considerations of judicial
economy can suffice to justify extension of the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction to a plaintiff's cause of action against a citizen of the same
State in a diversity case. Congress has established the basic rule that
diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 only when there is
complete diversity of citizenship.
Id. at 377. "Ancillary jurisdiction is not a device for plaintiffs. Rather, it is 'primarily a tool
for defendants, in a court against their will, to facilitate their assertion of claims against
84
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Before 1989, the federal courts assumed that they could exercise
jurisdiction over any matter authorized by Article III unless that
authority was expressly or implicitly negated by statute. 89 However, this
presumption changed after the Supreme Court in Finley v. United States,90
held that pendent and ancillary jurisdiction were unconstitutional
usurpations of power. 91
3.

The Effect of Finley on Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction

In Finley, the plaintiff asserted pendent jurisdiction to amend her
federal complaint to include claims against another defendant, who
shared state citizenry with the plaintiff, to which no independent basis
for federal jurisdiction existed. 92 However, since the claims asserted
against both the defendant of the federal claim and the defendant of the
state claim arose "from a common nucleus of operative facts," the district
court allowed the amended claim in the interest of "'economy and
efficiency' favored [by] trying the actions together." 93

others.'" Heather McDaniel, Plugging the Gaping Hole: The Effect of:28 U.S.C. § 1367 on the
Complete Diversih Requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 1069, 1080 (1997)
(quoting § 1367 as construed in David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary: The 1990 Adoption
of § 1367, Codifying "Supplemental" Jurisdiction, at 830 (West Supp. 1993).
89 Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976).
Gibbs and its lineal ancestor, Osborn, were couched in terms of Article
III's grant of judicial power in "Cases ... arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and [its] Treaties," since
they (and implicitly the cases which linked them) represented inquiries
into the scope of Art. III jurisdiction in litigation where the "common
nucleus of operative fact" gave rise to non-federal questions or claims
between the parties. None of them posed the need for a further
inquiry into the underlying statutory grant of federal jurisdiction or a
flexible analysis of concepts such as "question," "claim," and "cause of
action," because Congress had not addressed itself by statute to this
matter.
Id. (alteration in original).
90 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
91
Id. at 556.
92 Id. at 546-47. Plaintiff's husband and her two children died when an airplane, on
which they were passengers, struck electric transmission lines. Id. at 546. The plaintiff
brought a state-tort action against San Diego Gas and Electric Company. Id. The plaintiff
later learned that the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") was partly responsible for
the deaths and she filed an action against this agency in the federal district court. Id. She
then wanted to combine the suits by amending her federal complaint to include the San
Diego Gas and Electric Company as a co-defendant with the FAA. Id.
93 Id. at 547.
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However, the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia,
announced that pendent party jurisdiction must be authorized by an
affirmative congressional grant of jurisdiction. 94 The Court sent a clear
message to Congress that federal courts could no longer obtain
jurisdiction unless granted power to do so by the Constitution and
authorized to do so by Congress. 95 Recognizing the need for legislative
action, Justice Scalia wrote:
Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction
conferred by a particular statute can of course be
What is of paramount
changed by Congress.
importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a
background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may
96
know the effect of the language it adopts.
After the Finley decision, a plaintiff with an exclusively federal claim
and a closely related state claim did not have a forum that could hear the
97
entire case at once.
The Court's announcement extended beyond pendent party
jurisdiction and threatened all forms of pendent and ancillary
The Court turned the supplemental jurisdiction
jurisdiction. 98

Id. at 552-56.
Id. at 556; Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990
BYU L. REV. 247, 270.
[Tio preserve supplemental jurisdiction and thereby to ensure the
viability of the federal judiciary as an important player on federal
questions, Congress need only codify pendent party jurisdiction. In
effect, since the Finley Court appears adamant about applying stare
decisis to its cases on pendent claim and ancillary jurisdiction,
Congress need overrule only Finley'sexpress implications.
One can only speculate how the Supreme Court will apply stare
decisis in this area in the future. Indeed, as it stands now, Justice
Scalia may be able to deliver on his resolve not to "limit or impair"
Gibbs and the ancillary jurisdiction. In Finley four Justices joined his
opinion and four other Justices were outraged that the Court had cut
back at all on supplemental jurisdiction. No one presently on the
Court seems inclined to inflict any more damage.
Mengler, supra, at 270.
% Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
97
McDaniel, supra note 88, at 1082. "The claimant would have two alternatives: (1) split
the action and try each claim in a separate court, thereby wasting valuable time and judicial
resources; or (2) forsake either the federal or the state claim and sue in one forum." Id.
98
See McLaughlin, supra note 81, at 887-88 ("Finley raised substantial concerns about the
legitimacy of all existing forms of supplemental jurisdiction because, with one minor
94

95
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framework on its head by requiring Congress to expressly authorize any
form of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction that it wanted the federal courts
to possess. 99 Congress quickly responded with the passage of § 1367.100
C. Supplemental Jurisdiction: The Attempted Codification of Case Law in 28
U.S.C. § 1367
Approximately six months after Finley, Congress created the Federal
Courts Study Committee (a group of distinguished judges, lawyers, and
scholars). Congress instructed the Committee to analyze the current
problems facing the judiciary and to develop long-range strategies to
remedy the problems. 101
The Committee issued a report that
recommended, among other suggestions, that Congress expressly
authorize the doctrines of pendent claim, pendent party, and ancillary
jurisdiction under the new title of "supplemental jurisdiction." 10 2 After
considering the Committee's recommendations, Congress enacted § 1367
as part of a comprehensive restructuring of the federal court system in
Title III of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.103

exception, no form of supplemental jurisdiction was expressly authorized by Congress.").
At the time that Finley was decided, the only statute that expressly authorized the exercise
of supplemental jurisdiction was 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which allowed the federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction over related state unfair competition claims asserted in federal patent,
copyright, and trademark cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (2000).
99
Mengler, supra note 95, at 255 ("In Finley, the Supreme Court turned this analytic
framework on its head and in the process took the breath away from all forms of
supplemental jurisdiction.").
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
47-48 (1990) [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT]. In 1989, Congress created this committee to
"examine problems and issues currently facing the courts of the United States" and to
"develop a long-range plan for the future of the Federal Judiciary." Id.
101 See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat.
4642 (1988) [hereinafter Improvements Act] (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
102 H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 47 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6873-74. The
Committee recommended that "Congress expressly authorize federal courts to hear any
claim arising out of the same 'transaction or occurrence' as a claim within federal
jurisdiction, including claims, within federal question jurisdiction, that require the joinder
of additional parties, namely defendants against whom that plaintiff has a closely related
state claim." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 100, at 47.
103
28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Congressional grant of supplemental jurisdiction provides that:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United

100
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Congress' primary intention in codifying supplemental jurisdiction
was to overrule Finley and to restore the exercise of pendent and
1 4
ancillary jurisdiction as they had existed prior to the Finley decision. 0
The House Report accompanying the statute notes that § 1367 codifies
the scope of supplemental jurisdiction first articulated by the Supreme
l05
Court in Gibbs and implements the principal rationale of Kroger.
However, legislative history shows that some of the Gibbs factors were
intentionally excluded during the drafting processY°6 The general

States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district
courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a)
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14,
19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by
persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules,
or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction.
Id. See Improvements Act, supra note 101. The passage of this Act began heated debate
among scholars regarding whether the statute only created new gaps in the federal courts'
jurisdictional authority. Thomas D. Rowe et al., A Coda on Supplemental Jurisdiction, 40
EMORY L.J. 993, 993 (1991). Namely, scholars have debated whether the statute succeeded
in filling a gap in federal courts' jurisdictional authority created by Finley or whether the
new statute is an "unmitigated unsalvageable flop" which created new gaps on its own. Id.
104 136 CONG. REC. S17, 580-81 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). The House Report states that
§ 1367 "would authorize jurisdiction in a case like Finley, as well as essentially restore the
pre-Finley understandings of the authorization for and limits on other forms of
H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990
supplemental jurisdiction."
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6874.
105 H.R. REP. No. 101-734 at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875 nn.15-16; see
supra note 88 (quoting the rationale of Kroger that ancillary jurisdiction cannot be used to
thwart the complete diversity requirement of § 1332).
106 Improvements Act, supra note 101; Jon D. Corey, Comment, The DiscretionaryExercise
of Supplemental Jurisdiction Under the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 1995 BYU L. REV. 1263,
1281-82. The Working Papers of the Federal Courts Study Committee to the penultimate
draft of the statute before Congress demonstrate that the Gibbs factors were in the text of
the proposed statute, but they were withdrawn at the last minute because some
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consensus was that the statute restored the federal courts' power to
exercise pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as it had existed prior to
Finley. 0 7 However, § 1367 did more than just overrule Finley; the statute
created the presumption that certain state-law claims that could not
independently be heard in federal court under the common law would be
heard in federal court under the statute.108
1.

The General Rule of § 1367(a)

Section 1367(a) codifies the Gibbs standard by requiring federal
courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all claims "so related"
to the anchor claims that they "form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution." 1°9 The last sentence
in subsection (a) achieves the main purpose of the Committee's
recommendation in that it expressly overrules Finley by allowing
supplemental jurisdiction for parties who are joined or who intervene
under the federal rules. 110 Thus, § 1367(a) not only authorizes district
courts to hear state-law claims that have a common nucleus of operative
fact to the anchor claim, but the subsection also requires the district court
to hear such claims 11
2.

The Limitations Imposed by § 1367(b)

The general grant of jurisdictional power contained in subsection (a),
which applies equally to cases based on federal question jurisdiction as
well as cases based on diversity jurisdiction, is subject to the limitations
provided in subsection (b). 112 Subsection (b) preserves the Kroger rule by

commentators had criticized that language as allowing too much discretion to the district
courts. Id.
107
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rationalizingjurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 3, 3 (1992) ("[Tlhe
new law is very desirable in allowing pendent party jurisdiction and in reversing the
Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United States.").
108 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see supranotes 103-07.
109 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
For a useful discussion of the relationship between the
constitutional limits of supplemental jurisdiction and the "common nucleus" test of Gibbs,
see McLaughlin, supra note 81, at 890-95.
110 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (authorizing supplemental jurisdiction over "claims that involve
the joinder or intervention of additional parties"). "In providing for supplemental
jurisdiction over claims involving the addition of parties, subsection (a) explicitly filled the
statutory gap noted in Finley v. United States." H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860,6875.
111 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
112
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). Commentators have exposed several gaps, anomalies, and
unanswered questions in § 1367(b). See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer,
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prohibiting the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when the following
three factors are present: (1) the court's original jurisdiction is based on
diversity; (2) the plaintiff is the party seeking to assert supplemental
jurisdiction; and (3) exercising such jurisdiction would be inconsistent
with the requirements of the diversity statute. 113 Therefore, plaintiffs
cannot use the supplemental jurisdiction of the federal courts to assert
claims in diversity actions "against persons made parties under Rule 14,
19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by
persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19" if the joinder
of the additional claims would be inconsistent with the statutory
requirements for diversity jurisdiction.11 4 However, if the anchor claim
is based on a federal question, or if the state-law claim is not excluded by
5
§ 1367(b), then the district court is required to grant jurisdiction."
3.

The Grant of Discretion in § 1367(c)

Subsections 1367(a)-(b) are mandatory rules of inclusion and
exclusion. 116 The language in subsection (a) is mandatory -the district
courts "shall" have supplemental jurisdiction- and goes further than
Gibbs, which stated that courts had discretion over whether to exercise

Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disasterof the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J.
963, 980 (1991) [hereinafter Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws] ("Underinclusion in section
"1367(b) results in an unduly broad grant of jurisdiction. Overinclusion in section 1367(b)
results in undue constriction of federal jurisdiction.").
113 See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1978) (holding that a
plaintiff cannot use pendent jurisdiction to secure subject matter jurisdiction over a
nondiverse third-party defendant in an action based solely on diversity).
114 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
The federal rules referenced in subsection (b) include the
following:
Rule 14, which provides for third-party suits such that any time after the
commencement of the suit, the defendant- or plaintiff acting as a defendant- may become
a third-party plaintiff and bring an action against a third party for all or part of the original
plaintiff's claim or original defendant's cross-claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a), (b). Rule 19,
which provides for compulsory joinder over absent parties if in such absence complete
relief cannot be accorded among those who are already parties, and if not joining may
impair the ability of those absent parties to protect their interests, or if not joining would
place persons already parties to the suit in jeopardy of inconsistent obligations. Id. at 19(a).
Rule 20, which allows for permissive joinder of additional parties who either assert rights
or have rights asserted against them that arise out of the same transaction involving the
original parties. Id. at 20(a). Rule 24, which provides the right of intervention for anyone
who is permitted to intervene under a federal statute or whose rights will be impaired,
unless there is an opportunity to protect his or her interests. Id. at 24(a), (b). Additionally,
subsection (b) allows for permissive intervention when provided by federal statute or
when the person's claim or defense has common questions of law or fact. Id. at 24(b).
115 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
116 See supra Part II.C.1-2.
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pendent jurisdiction." 7 Thus, district courts must grant jurisdiction over
state-law claims that are "so related" that they form the same case or
controversy as the anchor claim, and must dismiss any claims excluded
by § 1367(b). 118 However, § 1367(c) gives the court discretion to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction in specific circumstances:
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim in subsection (a) if(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State
law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim
or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction." 9
In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 120 the Supreme
Court interpreted this statutory discretion when it explained that the
supplemental jurisdiction statute "codifies those principles" of economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity that inform the discretionary regime of
Gibbs.121 But since Gibbs provided more discretion to district courts than
does the text of § 1367(c), the federal courts have differing opinions on
the boundaries of this discretion. 22

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Cf. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
118 See supra Part II.C.1.
119 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
117

120

522 U.S. 156 (1997).

Id. at 165. "Section 1367, by its terms, neither allows nor prohibits a district court from
remanding federal claims to state court when the court exercises its discretion to decline
jurisdiction under § 1367(c)." Joseph N. Akrotirianakis, Comment, Learning to Follow
Directions: When District Courts Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c), 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 995, 1004 (1998). "This discretionary language appears
to codify the Gibbs test for those instances when a court should decline pendent
jurisdiction." Id.
122 See infra Part II.C.4.
121
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Two Ways to Interpret § 1367(c)'s Grant of Discretion

The fundamental issue over subsection (c) was whether it was
intended to codify prior case law or to modify the analysis of Gibbs and
its progeny. 123 Textually, § 1367 limits the federal courts' discretion by
requiring the adjudication of supplemental claims unless one of the four
circumstances enumerated in subsection (c) is present. 124 Subsection (a)
states that the court "shall have" supplemental jurisdiction over the
related state claims. 125 When coupled with the language of subsection
(c), which states that courts "may" decline jurisdiction in any of the four
circumstances, the "shall" of subsection (a) appears to create a
presumption to grant jurisdiction except in certain situations. 126 That
presumption contradicts the Gibbs model, which allowed the court
unfettered discretion in exercising jurisdiction over the state-law
claims. 127 Under the plain meaning of the statute, a district court's
decision whether to exercise jurisdiction no longer includes an openended mandate to consider issues such as efficiency, federal policy, or
jury confusion.128
Instead, a court must fit the refusal to hear
29
supplemental claims into one of the four circumstances of § 1367(c).1

123 See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
124 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4). The four discretionary dismissal factors are: (1) novel
state issue; (2) supplemental claim predominates over anchor claim; (3) dismiss of all
anchor claims; and (4) exceptional circumstances. See supra note 103 for full text of the
statute.
125 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
126

See id. § 1367(c).

127 See John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdictionand Venue:
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 735, 766 (1991) ("By the
juxtaposition of sections 1367(a) and 1367(c) Congress appears to have created a strong
presumption in favor of the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.").
128 See SIEGEL, supra note 88, at 831 ("The conferral is in mandatory terms-the court
'shall' have the supplemental jurisdiction-but subdivision (c), treated below, gives the
court discretion to 'decline to exercise' the supplemental jurisdiction in various
circumstances.").
129 See Steven H. Steinglass, Litigating State Employment Discrimination Claims in Federal
Courts Under the New Doctrineof Suppleniental Jurisdiction,C780 ALI-ABA 467,487 (1993).
Congress focused on the comity-related discretionary factors while
saying nothing explicit in either the statutory language or the
legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 about efficiency-related factors.
Gibbs had defined the discretionary leg in terms of "judicial economy,
convenience and fairness to litigants" but had identified concerns
going to both comity and efficiency. In § 1367(c), however, Congress
did not use the Gibbs efficiency-related language. Rather, Congress
restricted refusals to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to the three
enumerated factors and the fourth undefined catchall for "exceptional
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Five appellate circuits have taken the position that § 1367(c) narrows
judicial discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction as compared to
the level of discretion allowed under Gibbs.13o Thus, a federal court is
limited to the four circumstances listed in § 1367(c) when determining
whether it has discretion to dismiss the state-law claim. 131 Such a textual
reading of § 1367 would be correct only if the language of the statute was
132
clear and unambiguous.
Assuming that a court interpreting § 1367 should consult the
statute's legislative history, the only insight within the legislative history
is in the House Report connected with the supplemental jurisdiction
statute. 133 Although the House Report is not lengthy, it does provide
valuable insight into the legislative purposes underlying § 1367.34 The
House Report states that the supplemental jurisdiction statute "codifies
the scope of supplemental jurisdiction [that was] first articulated by the
Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs." 135 Thus, contextualists

circumstances" when there were "other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction." Consequently, federal district courts deciding
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction no longer have an openended mandate to consider "judicial economy, convenience or fairness
to litigants" but must fit the refusal to hear state law claims into one of these
fourfactorsof§ 1367(c).
Id. (emphasis added).
130 See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that the district court erred in assuming that § 1367 codified Gibbs and thus
declining supplemental jurisdiction); McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1994)
(stating that a district court is required to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related
state law claims unless one of the statutory exceptions applies); Executive Software N. Am.,
Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1556 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that it is clear
that Congress intended § 1367(c) to provide the exclusive means by which supplemental
jurisdiction can be declined by a court, and a contrary reading of the statute would appear
to render section 1367(c) superfluous); Palmer v. Hosp. Auth., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir.
1994) (stating that the district court should consider the statutory language first, and if one
factor under § 1367(c) is present, then the district court may consider the Gibbs factors);
Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding a statutory reason to decline
supplemental jurisdiction and supplementing its analysis with Gibbs factors only after
making an independent determination under the supplemental jurisdiction statute).
131 See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
132 See supra Part III.A. for a discussion of the two ways to interpret § 1367(c)'s grant of
discretion: textual or contextual.
133 See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 27, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6873-76. But see
Corey, supranote 106, at 1294 (arguing that section 1367(c)(4) was not meant to incorporate
the non-codified Gibbs factors and act as a "catchall").
134 Akrotirianakis, supra note 121, at 1006 ("What little the House Report does provide,
however, gives valuable insight into the legislative purposes underlying § 1367.").
135 H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875 n.15.
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view supplemental jurisdiction as a doctrine of discretion, not of a
Six appellate courts have interpreted the
plaintiff's right. 36
supplemental jurisdiction statute as a codification of Gibbs and still
perform a broad Gibbs-style analysis instead of applying the narrower
language of the statute.137
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify this in City of
Chicago.138 However, it failed to do so, saying, "[W]e have indicated that
'district courts [should] deal with cases involving pendent claims in the
manner that best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.' The
supplemental jurisdiction statute codifies these principles." 139 This
decision had the effect of saying that both sides of the debate are correct.
In sum, the text of § 1367(c) allows federal courts to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction when one of the four listed factors are
present. 140 However, some courts have interpreted this section to also
allow for a broad Gibbs-style analysis which includes additional factors

136 Cf.United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (holding that "pendent
jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right"). Judge Posner stated that
"[t]he legislative history indicates that the new statute is intended to codify rather than to
alter the judge-made principles of pendent and pendent party jurisdiction." Brazinski v.
Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1993).
137 See Anglemyer v. Hamilton County Hosp., 58 F.3d 533, 541 (10th Cir. 1995) (adopting
the Thatcher test, despite the availability of § 1367); Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57
F.3d 1168, 1175 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that a district court retains its discretionary
authority to "entertain a new, unpleaded (but related) claim"); Borough of W. Mifflin v.
Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 1995) (informing the district court that the proper
analysis is one under a Gibbs-based reading of § 1367 that imparts broad discretion to
decline supplemental claims to the district court); Diven v. Amalgamated Transit Union
Int'l, 38 F.3d 598, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (expanding the discretion allowed under § 1367(c) by
holding that the test for substantial predominance was "whether the state claims are more
complex or require more judicial resources to adjudicate or are more salient in the case as a
whole than the federal law claims"); Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1182 (leading the other courts into
reading § 1367(c) as a codification of the Gibbs factors and not as a change in the scope of a
district court's discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction). The Thatcher test states that
"discretion should be exercised in those cases in which, given the nature and extent of
pretrial proceedings, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness would be served by
retaining jurisdiction." Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254
(6th Cir. 1996) ("A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims."); Thatcher Enters. v. Cache County Corp.,
902 F.2d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1990)).
138 City of Chi. v. Int'l Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
139 Id. at 172-73 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)).
140 See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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for dismissal. 141 The practical effect of this history is that a presumption
clearly exists that district courts should exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. 42 However, it is unclear whether the timing of the
discretionary analysis alters this presumption or whether the availability
of an alternate forum should be a factor when exercising the
143
discretion.
5.

The Statute of Limitations Tolling Provision in § 1367(d)

Section 1367(d) recognizes that serious statute of limitations
problems may arise for plaintiffs whose state-law claims have been
dismissed by the district court-without a tolling provision, plaintiffs
could be left without a forum to hear their claims.144 Subsection (d)
provides that all claims asserted under the supplemental jurisdiction
statute and later dismissed, plus those that are voluntarily dismissed at
the same time, will have the state statute of limitations tolled while the
claim is pending in federal court. 45 The statute also permits a tolling
period in excess of thirty days if applicable state law provides for a
longer tolling period.' 46 This incorporation of state law is significant
because several state tolling statutes provide for tolling periods longer
147
than thirty days.
But there are some problems with § 1367(d). First, even in states
with tolling provisions, these provisions do not always apply to claims
that are voluntarily dismissed or dismissed for reasons other than

141
142
143
144
145

See supra note 138.
See infra Part III.B-C.
See infra Part III.A.
See Siegel, supra note 88, at 836; infra note 164 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2000).
The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a),
and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed
at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection
(a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30
days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling
period.

Id.
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-14 (Michie 1978); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 205(a)
(McKinney 1990); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.064(a)(2) (Vernon 1986).
147
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-14 (six months); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 205(a) (six
months); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.064(a)(2) (sixty days).
146
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jurisdictional defects. 148 In addition, the Supreme Court in Raygor v.
Regents of University of Minnesota,149 held that the supplemental
jurisdiction statute does not toll the statute of limitations for claims
against nonconsenting states filed in federal court and subsequently
dismissed on Eleventh Amendments grounds.150 The combination of the
lack of the tolling provision in certain situations and unclear boundaries
hardship
for discretionary dismissal in § 1367(c) creates an incredulous
5
for plaintiffs like Raygor, as was shown in the Introduction.' '
Ill.

LEGAL ANALYSIS: TIMING IS EVERYTHING

This Part discusses the statutory interpretation of § 1367(c) and
shows how the timing of the discretionary dismissal inquiry can affect
the presumption of whether to maintain jurisdiction. 5 2 Timing is only a
factor when the dismissal of the anchor claim triggers the discretionary
Therefore, when a federal court is using
dismissal inquiry.15 3
§1367(c)(3), the presumption of whether to maintain jurisdiction
switches after substantial pretrial proceedings have occurred. 154 Failure
to take this factor into consideration can create hardship for plaintiffs
55
like Raygor if § 1367(d) does not toll the state statute of limitations.
This Part discusses reasons for revising § 1367(d) so that the state statute
of limitations is tolled for all claims brought under the supplemental
156
jurisdiction statute.

148 See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 205(a) (stating that New York's tolling provisions do
not apply if the prior action was voluntarily terminated); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 16.064 (providing for tolling if the first action is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
149 534 U.S. 533 (2002).

150 Id. at 548. Raygor held that
respondent never consented to suit in federal court on petitioners' state
law claims and that § 1367(d) does not toll the period of limitations for
state law claims asserted against nonconsenting state defendants that
are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Therefore, § 1367(d)
did not operate to toll the period of limitations for petitioners' claims.
Id.
151 See supra Part I. Raygor did not have an alternate forum to have his claim of
discrimination heard because of the jurisdictional hole that the Court exposed in Raygor.
534 U.S. at 546.
152 See infra Part III.A.
153 See infra Part III.B.
154 See infra Part III.B.1-2.

155 See supra Part I. Raygor was deprived of any forum to hear his discrimination claim.
156 See infra Part III.D.
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The timing of the discretionary analysis becomes an issue in the
third dismissal factor, subsection (c)(3), which involves the use of the
federal courts to litigate state-law claims when the anchor claim has been
dismissed on a nonjurisdictional basis. 5 7 In this situation only the statelaw claims are left to be resolved.15 8 By not imposing time limitations on
a discretionary dismissal, the statute continues the rule established in
Gibbs that the propriety of supplemental jurisdiction "remains open
throughout the litigation."' 59 This timing issue is not raised by
subsections (c)(1)-(2) and (4), which naturally become an issue only at the
160
initial stages of the suit and can be determined from the pleadings.
Thus, the same discretionary inquiry is not appropriate for subsection
(c)(3).161 To provide fairness to litigants, the debate on the appropriate
162
level of dismissal discretion must be resolved.
A. Interpretive Disagreements Over the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute
Almost immediately following its passage, § 1367 provoked debate
in the legal and academic communities. 163 Critics challenged the
formulation of the statute, highlighting the issues left unsettled or
confused by codification.1M Criticisms included the failure to address
whether the statute applied to removal cases and whether individual
claims that did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, such as

157

See infra Part III.C.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2000) (becoming a dismissal factor only after all anchor claims
have been dismissed).
159
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966). As explained by the Court in
Carnegie-Mellon, "[uinder Gibbs, a federal court should consider and weigh in each case,
and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that
court involving pendent state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,
350 (1988).
160
See infra text accompanying notes 180-85.
161
See infra text accompanying notes 201-05.
158

162

See infra Part 11.B-C.

McDaniel, supra note 88, at 1089 (addressing the debate on the proper statutory
interpretation of § 1367); see Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws, supra note 112, at 964
(summarizing the negative reactions to § 1367 among "[dlistinguished commentators").
164
See generally Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws, supra note 112, at 963 (attacking the statute
on the basis that it includes unintended ambiguities); Chemerinsky, supra note 107, at 3
(pointing to ambiguities in historical treatment of jurisdiction that creates ambiguities in
statute); Rowe, supra note 103, at 943 (attacking the fact that § 1367 reflects a bias toward
diversity jurisdiction).
163

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 [2004], Art. 6

1486

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.38

class action suits, could be heard under § 1367.165 More generally, some
commentators suggested that the statute was "poorly. drafted" and
passed without proper "public ventilation and congressional
scrutiny." 166 The result, they argued, was "[the] most wasteful type of
167
litigation- fights over jurisdiction."
These fights over jurisdiction arise from different statutory
interpretations of § 1367.168
The disagreement as to the correct
interpretation of § 1367 can be illustrated by two approaches to statutory
interpretation:
the "textualist" approach and the "contextualist"
69
approach.
One form of textualism is referred to as "four corners,"
meaning that a court should only look within the four corners of the
statutory text to .determine the statute's meaning. 170 But other textualists
prefer a broader approach to interpretation wherein the meaning of a
statute should be gleaned from the statutory text, "without unnecessary
recourse to the legislative history or other materials."' 7' Textualists are

165 See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996);
Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995); In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir.
1995).
166 Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws, supra note 112, at 964; Thomas C. Arthur & Richard
Freer, Close Enoughfor Government Work: WAhat Happens WAhen Congress Doesn't Do Its Job, 40
EMORY L.J. 1007 (1991) [hereinafter Arthur & Freer, Close Enough].
167 Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws, supra note 112, at 964; Arthur & Freer, Close Enough,
supra note 166, at 1007.
168 See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
169 Laura L. Hirschfeld, The $50,000 Question: Does Supplemental Jurisdiction Extend to
Claims Between Diverse Parties Which Do Not Meet 1332's Amount-in-Controversy
Requirement?, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 107, 118 (1995). The textualist approach "favor[s]
interpreting statutes using nothing but the literal language of the statute itself." Id. The
contextualist approach "believe[s] that a statute often cannot be clearly interpreted and
applied without a thorough review of its legislative history." Id.
170
Id.
171

Id.

"Plain meaning" advocates argue that the meaning of a statute should
be gleaned from the text of the statute itself, without unnecessary
recourse to the legislative history or other materials. "Textualists" fear
that use of legislative materials such as committee hearing notes, floor
debates, and earlier bill drafts- materials which are often drafted by
persons other than legislators, frequently go unread and do not make
it into the final text-compromises the integrity of the legislative
process. To incorporate these sources, the textualist theory goes, is the
worst sort of judicial activism- impermissible judicial legislation.
Further, the ability to meddle with the meaning of statutory text opens
a Pandora's box of temptations, not the least of which is the temptation
to substitute case-by-case, result-oriented jurisprudence for the rule of
law.
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concerned that legislative materials are often drafted by persons other
172
than legislators and frequently go unread by the voting Congress.
According to a textualist, the ideas from many committee hearing notes,
floor debates, and earlier drafted bills do not make it into the final draft,
and the use of such materials to gain legislative intent compromises the
integrity of the legislative process. 73
On the other hand, contextualists condemn excessively conservative
statutory interpretation because it ignores the social and historical
context necessary to ascertain the true intent of the legislators who
drafted the unclear statute.174 Therefore, the initial inquiry is whether
the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous. 75
The dividing line between judicial interpretation and judicial
legislation becomes particularly gray when the argument is not over
what a statute says, but rather what is does not say. 7 6 Section 1367(a)
clearly creates a presumption for district courts to have jurisdiction over
all state-law claims that are so related to the anchor claims that they form

Id.
172

Id.

173

Id.

174 Id. at 119. "'Contextualists' or 'intentionalists' argue that a statute's language (and
thus its application) is often unclear, and therefore, to perform the proper judicial function
of interpretation, one must study the legislative history to ascertain the legislature's intent
in enacting the statute." Id.; see also Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of
Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme
Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 301 (1990). Justice Benjamin Cardozo has been characterized
as a moderate contextualist because of his view about judicial interpretation. Wald, supra
at 301. In the words of Cardozo:
There are times when the source is obvious. The rule that fits the case
may be supplied by the constitution or by statute. If that is so, the
judge looks no farther. The correspondence ascertained, his duty is to
obey. The constitution overrides a statute, but a statute, if consistent
with the constitution, overrides the law of judges. In this sense, judgemade law is secondary and subordinate to the law that is made by
legislators.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS § 102, at 14 (1921).

17 W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991). "Where [the statutory
text] contains a phrase that is unambiguous -that has a clearly accepted meaning in both
legislative and judicial practice -we do no permit it to be expanded or contracted by the
statements of individual legislators or committees during the course of the enactment
process." Id.
176 CARDOZO, supra note 174, at 14-15. "Interpretation is often spoken of as if it were
nothing but the search and the discovery of a meaning ... [tihe ascertainment of intention
may be the least of a judge's troubles in ascribing meaning to a statute." Id.
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part of the same case or controversy. 177 Therefore, the presumption for
§ 1367(c) is that courts should maintain jurisdiction unless doing so
would be adverse to the principles of economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity, and the authorization for dismissal is among the four
circumstances listed in § 1367(c). 178
B.

Proper Statutory Interpretationof § 1367(c)(1)-(2) and (4)

Section 1367(a) states that a federal court shall hear claims that are so
related that they form the same case or controversy as the anchor
claim. 179 When the district courts inquire into whether they should
dismiss a claim based on § 1367(c)(1)-(2) and (4), the inquiry only takes
place at the beginning of the suit. At this time, any dismissal will not
necessarily be adverse to the principles of economy, convenience,
fairness, or comity, because the parties have not yet invested large
amounts of time and resources into the suit at the federal forum.1 80 In
exercising their discretion under § 1367(c), courts should be mindful that
although the statute is intended to preserve and codify the court's
traditional right to decline supplemental jurisdiction in an appropriate
case, this right is to be exercised only when legitimate and compelling
considerations of federalism and fairness outweigh the valid goals of
181
supplemental jurisdiction.
Section 1367(a) creates a presumption that the district court shall
grant jurisdiction, and § 1367(c) should be read to create a presumption
to maintain jurisdiction except for exceptional circumstances where
maintaining jurisdiction will be adverse to the principles of economy,
convenience, fairness, or comity. For example, the statute's use of "other
compelling reasons" as the residual standard in § 1367(c)(4)
demonstrates the congressional understanding that discretionary
dismissal under any provision of § 1367(c) should be reserved for
compelling circumstances. 8 2 Therefore, the text of § 1367(c)(1)-(2) and

177 See supra Part I.C.1.

178 See supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
179 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
180 See supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
181 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
182 Akrotirianakis, supra note 121, at 1026-27. Professor Georgene Vairo and other legal
scholars have suggested that § 1367(c)(4)'s "exceptional circumstances" language is taken
from the Supreme Court's opinion in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States. Id. Discussing the doctrine of abstention in the majority's opinion in Colorado River,
Justice Brennan held that the "[a]bdication of [a district court's] obligation to decide cases
can be justified under this [abstention] doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances
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(4) clearly establishes a presumption to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. 83. It also clearly reserves the district court's discretion to
dismiss or remove any claims under §1367(c)(1)-(2) and (4) in
exceptional circumstances. 8 4
However, the fourth factor, § 1367(c)(4), has been interpreted to read
the prior common law back into the statute. 185 For example, the Supreme
Court recognized jury confusion as a factor that could be included in the
"exceptional circumstances" language of (c)(4).186 Gibbs specifically
suggests jury confusion as an instance that would make the exercise of
pendent claims improper. 87 Thus, some courts interpret (c)(4) as a
"catchall section" since there is no guidance on what those exceptional
circumstances are or when they are properly deemed to be compelling.88
Since § 1367(c)(4) is not textually clear as to what exceptional
circumstances are, it is proper to look to the legislative history for this

where the order to the parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an important
countervailing interest." Colo. R. Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
813 (1976) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 180-89
(1959)).
Justice Brennan further stated that prior decisions of the Supreme
Court had "confined [these exceptional] circumstances appropriate for
abstention to three general categories:" (1) "'cases presenting a federal
constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a different
posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law;"' ... (2)
"where there have been presented difficult questions of state law
bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose
importance transcends the result in the case then at bar;" ... and (3)
where there are certain ongoing state proceedings.
Akrotirianakis, supra note 121, at 1027 (alteration in original). Situations such as thesewhich warrant abstention in order to serve "an important countervailing interest" would
undoubtedly qualify as "exceptional circumstances" in which there are "compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction" under § 1367(c)(4). Id. "In determining whether
'exceptional circumstances' and 'compelling reasons' exist for declining jurisdiction under
§ 1367(c)(4), a court should look to the guidance of the Supreme Court, handed down
through its opinion in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs." Id. at 1031.
183
See supra text accompanying notes 180-82.
1&4 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
15
Corey, supra note 106, at 1287 ("Some courts have ... used [§ 1367(c)](4) to read prior
practice back into the [supplemental jurisdiction] statute.").
186
Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 716 (1973) (stating that the supplemental
jurisdiction statute would include jury confusion as an "exceptional circumstance" where
the court could decline jurisdiction); see also Vera-Lozano v. Int'l Broad., 50 F.3d 67 (1st Cir.
1995) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the
possibility of jury confusion when considering whether to allow supplemental claims).
187
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966).
Akrotirianakis, supra note 121, at 1008; see also Vera-Lozano, 50 F.3d at 69; Moor, 411
188
U.S. at 716.
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determination. 189 Therefore, as § 1367 was intended to codify Gibbs,
courts should use § 1367(c)(4) to dismiss claims that are adverse to the
principles of economy, convenience, fairness, or comity. However,
§ 1367(c)(4), like § 1367(c)(1)-(2), should only be used at the beginning of
the suit before the parties have invested large amounts of time and
resources into the suit in the federal forum. 190
C. The AppropriatePresumptionfor § 1367(c)(3)
Whether a district court abuses its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction owing to the dismissal of the anchor claims
will likely depend on the stage in the litigation when the dismissal takes
place. 191 If these main claims are dismissed before substantial pretrial
proceedings have occurred, then the district court's decision to decline
192
supplemental jurisdiction will likely be "almost unreviewable."
However, if the main claims are dismissed after substantial pretrial
proceedings have occurred, an appellate court may scrutinize a district
193
court's decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

189 See supranotes 169-76 and accompanying text.
190
191

See supra text accompanying notes 180-83.
See Siegel, supra note 88, at 835.
Whether a dismissal of the touchstone claim should bring about a
dismissal (or remand, in a removal situation) of the dependent claim
for want of supplemental jurisdiction should hinge on the moment
within the litigation when the dismissal of the touchstone claim takes
place, and on the other surrounding circumstances. If, for example,
the main claim is dismissed early in the action, before any substantial
preparation has gone into the dependent claims, dismissing or
remanding the latter upon declining supplemental jurisdiction seems
fair enough. But if the dismissal of the main claim occurs late in the
action, after there has been substantial expenditure in time, effort, and
money in preparing the dependent claims, knocking them down with
a belated rejection of supplemental jurisdiction may not be fair.

Id.
192

Huffman v. Hains, 865 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1989).
[W]e have described the district court's discretion to relinquish pendent
jurisdiction as "almost unreviewable." ... This is especially so when all
federal claims have dropped from the case before trial, leaving only
state-law claims to decide. At that point, respect for the state's interest
in applying its own law, along with the state court's greater expertise
in applying state law, become paramount concerns.

Id.
193 See, e.g., Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pennsylvania, 983 F.2d 1277,1285

(3d Cir. 1993) (remanding subsection (c) issue and strongly hinting that district court
should exercise supplemental jurisdiction where that court "has already held a trial on the

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss4/6

Jones: It's All in the Timing: Rethinking Remand of Supplemental Claims

2004]

Supplemental Claims

1491

Before the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the practice was to
determine at what point in the proceeding the federal claim was
dismissed and to make the determination of whether or not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction based upon a simple efficiency analysis at that
point.194 Under this common law approach, the courts asked whether
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent and ancillary claims
would result in duplicative litigation in state court.' 95 This standard was
mentioned in Gibbs' dictum to illustrate that the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction would not be proper when the federal claim was dismissed
196
at the outset.
Although the Gibbs discretionary factors are not mentioned in the
statute or the legislative history, when faced with supplemental claims
after dismissal of a federal claim, most courts that have considered this
issue have held that dismissal of the federal claim does not mandate
dismissal or remand of the supplemental claims. 197 Instead, the courts
consider the goal of efficient adjudication of claims to determine whether

merits and has already heard all the evidence necessary to reach a decision on the
plaintiff's contract claim").
194 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). In Gibbs, dismissal of a
federal claim before trial was listed as an instance in which efficiency, fairness, and
economy would weigh in favor of dismissal of the pendent state claims as well. Id. In
Carnegie-Mellon the Court noted that the assertion in Gibbs that the pendent claims should
be dismissed once the jurisdiction-granting claim was dismissed did "not establish a
mandatory rule to be applied inflexibly in all cases." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).
195
See supra note 194.
1% Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 ("Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even
though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as
well.").
197 Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 (interpreting the effect § 1367(c) had on the Gibbs
analysis of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction).
Under Gibbs, a federal court should consider and weigh in each case,
and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to
exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving
pendent state-law claims. When the balance of these factors indicates
that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law
claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only
state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise
of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice. As articulated
by Gibbs, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction thus is a doctrine of
flexibility, designed to allow courts to deal with cases involving
pendent claims in the manner that most sensibly accommodates a
range of concerns and values.
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to dismiss or remand the state claims. 198 Thus, any presumption of
whether to dismiss a claim based on § 1367(c)(3) must be consistent with
this goal. 99
If the anchor claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court is divested of all power to adjudicate any
supplemental claim appended to it, and all supplemental claims must be
dismissed. 2°° Dismissal under this rule is mandated irrespective of the
amount of judicial time and energy that may have been expended on the
case because the court lacked constitutional authority to hear the case in
the first place. 20 1 The statute clearly effects no change in this view as
§ 1367(a)'s general grant of supplemental jurisdiction authority is
explicitly premised on the existence of a valid anchor claim within the
original jurisdiction of the federal courts. 202 Therefore, § 1367(c)(3)'s
dismissal analysis is only relevant if the anchor claim is dismissed for
non-jurisdictional reasons. 20 3 If dismissal of the anchor claim is for non-

198 See Timm v. Mead Corp., 32 F.3d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Harris v. Joint Sch.

Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 450 (9th Cir. 1994); Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1161-62
(11th Cir. 1994); Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding the district
court's weighing of economy, convenience, and fairness with respect to supplemental
claims after dismissal of federal claim); Taylor v. First of Am. Bank-Wayne, 973 F.2d 1284,
1287-89 (6th Cir. 1992) (considering judicial economy and fairness); ITT Commercial Fin.
Corp. v. Unlimited Automotive, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 664, 669 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (relying on
judicial economy and efficiency). But see Wentzka v. Gellman, 991 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir.
1993) (holding that exercise of pendent jurisdiction is an abuse of discretion unless there is
an alternate basis of jurisdiction for the claim or the statute of limitations has run on the
claim); Castellano v. Bd. of Trs. of Police, 937 F.2d 752, 758 (2d Cir. 1991) ("In deciding
whether to exercise discretion under Section 1367(c)(3), the Court should weigh and
consider several factors, including judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to
litigants.").
199 See supra note 198. Presumption for the § 1367(c)(3) discretionary dismissal must be
consistent with the goal of efficient adjudication of claims.
200 Molett v. Penrod Drilling Co., 919 F.2d 1000, 1004 (5th Cir. 1990).
201
See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 603 F.2d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Even where
substantial time and resources have been expended in the trial of an action in federal court,
pendent state claims must be dismissed if it later is determined that there never existed a
federal claim sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court.").
202
See, e.g., Ga. Carpet Sales, Inc. v. SLS Corp., 789 F. Supp. 244, 246 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("[Ihf
no jurisdictional predicate exists for [the original grant of jurisdiction] claim, then by
definition there is no 'supplemental jurisdiction' under Section 1367's recent replacement of
the pendent jurisdiction concept (for by definition there must be an original-jurisdiction
anchor to which the supplemental jurisdiction can attach).").
203
See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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subject matter jurisdictional grounds, then the timing of the dismissal
becomes an important factor.2°4
1.

Dismissal of Anchor Claim Before Substantial Pretrial Proceedings

After the anchor claim is dismissed for non-jurisdictional reasons,
courts must next consider prior case law to determine the presumption
that is appropriate for § 1367(c)(3). 205 In Gibbs, the Supreme Court stated:
"Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though
not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be
dismissed as well." 2 6 The Supreme Court refined this statement in
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill,20 7 and "made clear that this statement
does not establish a mandatory rule to be applied inflexibly in all
cases." 208 Rather, "[tjhe statement simply recognizes that in the usual
case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the
balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine -judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will
point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining statelaw claims." 20 9 Similarly, under § 1367(c)(3), the balance of these factors
also should point toward declining supplemental jurisdiction when the
claims conferring original jurisdiction are dismissed early in the
210
litigation.
2.

Dismissal of Anchor Claim After Substantial Pretrial Proceedings

After substantial pretrial proceedings have occurred, federal courts
may continue to exercise pendent jurisdiction after the dismissal of
Section
claims over which they had independent jurisdiction. 211

204

See infra Part III.C.1-2.

205 See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
206 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) ("Needless decisions of state
law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the
parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of [the] applicable law.").
207 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
208 Id.at 350 n.7.
Id. at 350.

209

210 See supra notes 194-98, 206-09.
211 See Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350; see also Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d
1050 (2d Cir. 1990) (permitting the continued exercise of pendent jurisdiction over state-law
claims after the dismissal of joined § 1983 claims); Ridenour v. Andrews Fed. Credit Union,
897 F.2d 715 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that it is now recognized that there are exceptions to the
usual rule requiring dismissal of pendent claims after dismissal of federal claims). Cf.
Jenkins v. Weatherholtz, 909 F.2d 105 (4th Cir. 1990) (requiring district courts to make a
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1367(c)(3) codifies the federal courts' power to continue to hear state-law
claims after the dismissal of federal-law claims. 212 This codified
accommodation of pendent claims requires a change in the approach of
district courts which currently justify the dismissal of state-law claims
after substantial pretrial proceedings simply by pointing to the section as
a reason to dismiss state-law claims. 213 Likewise, appellate courts that
customarily approve such refusals to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
should now be required to either remand for a proper exercise of
214
discretion or to engage in such a discretionary review themselves.
Therefore, the presumption is to keep subsection (a)'s general grant and
only dismiss if dismissal is in the interests of judicial economy, fairness,
convenience to the litigants, and comity. 215 After substantial pretrial
proceedings have occurred, it will neither be in the interests of judicial
economy, fairness, convenience to the litigants, nor comity to dismiss the
suit and force the plaintiffs to begin again in an alternate forum.
Furthermore, some plaintiffs, like Raygor, will not have an alternate
forum to begin again. Therefore, after substantial pretrial proceedings
have occurred, there should be a strong presumption for federal courts to
maintain jurisdiction and not use § 1367(c)(3) to dismiss the state-law
claims after the anchor claim has been dismissed.

discretionary decision about whether it will exercise pendent jurisdiction over a state-law
claim after the dismissal of a federal claim).
212 See, e.g., Williams v. City of River Rouge, 909 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that
pendent claims are normally dismissed without prejudice after dismissal of federal claim
before trial); see also Evans v. City of Marlin, Texas, 986 F.2d 104, 109 n.10 (5th Cir. 1993)
(recognizing that § 1367 makes clear that district courts have discretion to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction after the dismissal of all federal claims).
213 See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 200-13 and accompanying text.
215
See Sudarsky v. City of New York, 779 F. Supp. 287, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). "In light of
the dismissal of plaintiff's federal claims, dismissal of the pendent claims is appropriate as
well. 'It is well settled that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial even though not
insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well."' Id.
(quoting W. Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92, 104 (2d Cir. 1990)); see also Pomeroy
v. Schlegel Corp., 780 F. Supp. 980, 984 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) ("This court has dismissed all of
the claims over which it has original jurisdiction and, in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3), declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining
claims."). But see Plotkin v. Bearings Ltd., 777 F. Supp. 1105, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
[Cllause (3) of subdivision (c) allows the court to decline supplemental
jurisdiction if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction." ... Under the circumstances of the case this
Court determines that considerations of judicial economy, comity, and
fairness to the parties warrants the dismissal of the state claims and
counterclaims.
Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 178-79.
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Specific Judicial Findings Should Be Required for Dismissal

The American Legal Institute ("ALI") has undertaken a project to
propose a revision of many of the rules of federal judicial procedure
currently codified in § 1367.216 The ALI decided not to include a
provision in the proposed statute that would mandate that district
judges explicitly state their reasons under § 1367(c) for declining
supplemental jurisdiction.217 However, doing so would create a record
that would more easily be reviewable by the courts of appeals, should a
party appeal on the grounds of judicial abuse of discretion. The ALI's
concern was that judges would not support its revision of the
supplemental jurisdiction statute if such a provision was present.
However, since the judges must go through the discretionary
analysis already, there are no reasons of statutory simplicity or judicial
policy to avoid making specific findings. 218 When litigants have
participated in substantial pretrial procedures, a dismissal can be an
abuse of discretion granted by § 1367(c)(3) because such dismissal would
be against the interests of judicial economy, fairness, convenience to the
litigants, and comity. 219 Thus, to safeguard against abuse of discretion,
district court judges should be required to make specific findings if they
exercise their § 1367(c)(3) discretion to dismiss the state-law claims when

216 To learn more about the American Legal Institute, visit their website at http://
www.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
217 Rachel Ellen Hinkle, The Revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the Debate Over the District
Court's Discretion to Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction,69 TENN. L. REV. 111, 141-42 (2001).
The ALl decided not to include a provision in the proposed statute that
would mandate that district judges explicitly state their reasons under
§ 1367(c) for declining supplemental jurisdiction that was a mistake. If
district court judges are going through the analysis under § 1367(c),
what would be the harm in requiring those judges to put their reasons
on paper? This would create a record more easily reviewable by the
courts of appeals should a party appeal on the grounds of judicial
abuse of discretion. The ALI discussed and quickly rejected the idea of
including such a provision in the proposal, but not for reasons of
statutory simplicity or judicial policy. Rather, there was concern that
judges, who not only largely compose the ALl but are also the primary
audience for the proposed revision, would not support such a
provision.
Id.
218 Id.
219 See supra note 215.
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the anchor claims are removed from the suit after substantial pretrial
proceedings have occurred. 220
D. The Deficiency of §1367(d)'s Tolling of the State Statute of Limitations
Provision
Many courts prior to § 1367 held that it was an abuse of discretion to
dismiss a supplemental claim without first considering if the
supplemental claim would be time-barred in state court.221 This
consideration is analogous to the common law forum non conveniens
dismissal. A forum non conveniens dismissal permits a federal court to
refuse to proceed with a case before it and to dismiss so that an alternate
foreign or state jurisdiction can be sought. 222 At the outset of any forum
non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether an alternate
forum exists, and if no other forum does exist, "dismissal would not be
in the interests of justice." 223 On the other hand, some federal courts
upheld a district court's discretionary dismissal of supplemental claims
224
even though the claims may have been time-barred in state court.
Section 1367(d) provides for a tolling of the statute of limitations for
claims that are "asserted under subsection (a), and ... voluntarily
dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under
subsection (a)." 225 However, the Supreme Court exposed a large hole in
subsection (d) in Raygor v. Regents of University of Minnesota.226 In Raygor,
the petitioners filed a federal cause of action and a state-law cause of
action based upon a common nucleus of operative facts in federal court
against the state of Minnesota. 227 The State had given its consent to be

220 See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
221 See, e.g., Giardiello v. Balboa Ins. Co., 837 F.2d 1566, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988); Cooley v.
Pa. Hous. Fin. Agency, 830 F.2d 469, 476 (3d Cir. 1987); Henson v. Columbus Bank & Trust
Co., 651 F.2d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1981).
M2 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). The forum non conveniens dismissal
also allows a court to exercise its discretion to avoid the oppression or vexation that might
result from automatically honoring plaintiff's forum choice. Id.
M Id. at 254.
224 See, e.g., Notrica v. Bd. of Supervisors, 925 F.2d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 1991)
(distinguishing cases in other circuits and holding that "it [was] not an abuse of discretion
for the federal court to decline to consider state court time-bar" when plaintiff had initially
filed suits in the state and federal courts).
225 28 U.S.C § 1367(d) (2000).
226

534 U.S. 533 (2002).

227 Id. at 535-36, 545. "It is unclear if the tolling provision was meant to apply to
dismissals for reasons unmentioned by the statute, such as dismissals on Eleventh
Amendment grounds." Id. at 545; see Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809
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sued in its own courts for such violations, but had not given consent to
be sued in federal court. 228 The federal cause of action was dismissed on
non-jurisdictional grounds, and the district court used § 1367(c)(3) to
dismiss the petitioner's state-law claim. 229 The Court stated that the text
of subsection (d) that purports to apply to dismissals of "any claim
asserted under subsection (a)" does not abrogate the state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 23° The court said, "When Congress intends to
alter the 'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government,' it must make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute.' ' 231 Therefore, the Court held that "§ 1367(d)
does not toll the [statute] of limitations for ... claims ... against
nonconsenting State[s]" filed in federal court but subsequently dismissed
232
on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
This result goes against the goal of efficiency in supplemental
jurisdiction by forcing petitioners such as Raygor to either: (1) file the
claims in federal court; (2) file claims in state court; or (3) file two suits one in federal court and one in state court. 23 3 Congress should revise
§ 1367(c) so that the existence of an alternate forum is a statutory factor
for dismissal, or in the alternative, create a rule that will abrogate the
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity and apply § 1367(d) to situations
such as Raygor's.TM

(1989) ("It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must
be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.").
22
Raygor, 534 U.S. at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2N Id. at 537-38.
2M Id. at 542 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (emphasis added by Court)).
231 Id. at 543 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)).
232

Id. at 548.

233 See Janet L. Holt, Supreme Court Further Expands State Sovereignty, 38 ASS'N OF TRIAL
LAWYERS OF AM. 15 (May 2002). Erwin Chemerinsky, a law professor at the University of
Southern California, called Raygor "a trap for the unwary. It's a very technical decision,
and it will be easy for it to fall below the radar of many plaintiff attorneys." Id. It creates
difficult choices even for informed lawyers: "You can bring all your client's claims in
federal court, giving up the state forum; file in the state and give up the federal forum; or
file state and federal claims in federal court, and then, if the state statute of limitations is
about to expire, file in state court." Id. While the third choice might seem to be a good
option, "the risk is that whichever court decides first will preclude the other court from
deciding anything because of res judicata." Id. There is no good option for the plaintiff in
Raygor. See also supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 138-43. See also supra Part I for details concerning
Raygor's situation.
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Congress could include in § 1367(c)'s dismissal analysis the statutory
factor that an alternate forum must exist before a court can use its
discretion to not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
claims. 23 5 Since the existence of an alternate forum can be an issue at any
stage of the law suit, a federal court should consider this factor whenever
it is inquiring into whether to exercise its § 1367(c)(3) discretionary
dismissal power. Congress should also revise § 1367(d) so that it clearly
abrogates the state's immunity.
To abrogate a state's sovereign immunity, the Court must first ask
236
whether Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate.
Only then will it address whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid
exercise of power.2 37 In Raygor, Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority
that a clear statement of congressional intent was required. 238 In Raygor,
§ 1367(d) "fail[ed] this test," because it "reflect[ed] no specific or
unequivocal intent to toll the statute of limitations for claims asserted
Hence, Congress should revise
against nonconsenting States." 239
§ 1367(d) so that its original intention -to overrule Finley and codify
Gibbs' principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in all
cases -is clearly and unequivocally stated. 240 This revision will enable
the Supreme Court to take the next step in its Eleventh Amendment
inquiry and determine whether Congress has the power to abrogate the
state's immunity in this specific procedural matter.
Because of the ambiguity in § 1367(c)(3), a change also needs to be
made to more clearly state that the presumption shifts according to the
timing .of the dismissal of the anchor claim. 241 To safeguard against
misuse of dismissal discretion, after substantial pretrial proceedings
have occurred, district judges should be required to record their reasons

See infra note 281 (inserting the phrase in the proposed revision of § 1367(c)(3)).
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(expressing the need for Congress to clearly show its intent to abrogate).
237 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996). To determine whether a
statute validly abrogates the state's sovereign immunity, the Court must ask: "first,
whether Congress has unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate, ... and second,
whether Congress has acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power." Id.
2M
Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 544 (2002). The reason for the clear
statement is that by "allowing federal law to extend the time period in which a state
sovereign is amenable to suit in its own courts at least affects the federal balance in an area
that has been a historic power of the States." Id.
239 Id. at 534.
240 See infra Part IV.C.
241
See supra Part III.C.1-2.
235

2M
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for the exercise of such discretion.242 Finally, the situation of a plaintiff
having no forum to assert its claim after the discretionary dismissal of
the federal courts should be rectified. 243 Since the judiciary has not used
its opportunities to make these changes and has only furthered the
debates in these jurisdictional issues, Congress should take the initiative
to make the needed changes. 244 Congress should redraft § 1367(c)-(d).
IV. CONTRIBUTION -

A PROPOSED

REVISION OF §

1367(c)-(d)

This Part proposes a revision of § 1367(c)-(d), clarifying the
presumption that a federal court should have when using a discretionary
dismissal factor from § 1367(c), and addresses the hole that Raygor
exposed in § 1367(d). 245 The timing of the dismissal inquiry uniquely
affects § 1367(c)(3) since the dismissal of the anchor claim can happen at
any stage in the suit.246 Therefore, this Part proposes a revision of
§1367(c) that separates the current § 1367(c)(3)-which allows for
dismissal of a supplemental claim after all of the anchor claims have
247
been dismissed-from the other three dismissal circumstances.
Furthermore, this Part proposes a revision of the current § 1367(c)(3) that
takes into consideration the timing of the dismissal of the anchor
248
claim.
Section 1367(a) creates a presumption that a federal court shall
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all claims so related to the anchor
claim that they form part of the same case or controversy. 249 The
presumption of whether federal courts should maintain jurisdiction is
not as clear since this presumption depends upon the timing of the
dismissal inquiry. 25° Currently, § 1367(c)(3) is grouped with the other
dismissal factors. 251 However, §1367(c)(1)-(2) and (4) are always

242 See supra Part III.C.3
243 See supra Part III.D.
244 See infra Part IV for a proposed revision of § 1367(c)-(d).

245 See infra text accompanying notes 258, 279-80 for a proposed revision of the current
§ 1367(c)(1)-(2), (4), § 1367(c)(3), and § 1367(d) respectively.
246

See supra Part III.C.1-2.

247 See infra text accompanying note 278.
248 See infra text accompanying note 278.
249 See supra text accompanying notes 177-79.
250 See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
251 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2000). The four discretionary dismissal factors are: (1) novel
state issue; (2) supplemental claim predominates over anchor claim; (3) dismiss of all
anchor claims; and (4) exceptional circumstances. See supra note 103 for full text of the
statute.
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determined at the beginning of the suit.252 Thus, any dismissal based on
these factors occurs before the parties engage in substantial pretrial
expenses. In contrast, the courts can dismiss the state-law claim at any
time in the suit if the anchor claim is dismissed. 2 3 Therefore, the
presumption of whether a federal court should maintain jurisdiction is
24
different for § 1367(c)(1)-(2) and (4) than for § 1367(c)(3). 5
A.

Revision of§ 1367(c)(1)-(2) and (4)

At the beginning of a suit, the discretionary dismissal of certain
claims will not thwart the purpose of the supplemental jurisdiction
statute because the litigants have not yet invested a large amount of time
and resources bringing their suit in the federal forum. 255 Therefore,
federal courts should maintain discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that: (1) raises a novel or complex
issue of state law; (2) substantially predominates over the claim or claims
over which the district court has original jurisdiction; or (3) in
exceptional circumstances where there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction. 25 6 The third situation, which allows for discretion
to dismiss supplemental claims in exceptional circumstances, should
only be used when dismissal is at the beginning of the suit and dismissal
25 7
is in the interests of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.
Therefore, § 1367(c) should be revised to read as follows:
(c) The district courts may initially decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under
subsection (a) if(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State
law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the
claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction, or

252

See supra Part III.B.

253 See supra Part III.C.
254
255

See supra Part III.B-C.
See supra Part III.B.

256 See supra note 103 for the current text of § 1367(c)(1)-(2), (4).
257 See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
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(3) in exceptional circumstances where there are
other compelling
reasons
for declining
2
jurisdiction. [formerly § 1367(c)(4)]. 58
This revision will maintain the current status of § 1367(c)(1)-(2) and
The word "initially" should be added in the description so it is
textually clear that these discretionary dismissal factors will only be used
at the beginning of the suit.26° This addition will insure that the
dismissal factors, especially the "exceptional circumstances" factor, will
not be used after substantial pretrial proceedings have occurred, and
261
thus will promote efficiency and fairness of trials.
(4).259

B.

Revision of§ 1367(c)(3)

The anchor claim can be dismissed at any time in the suit.262 Thus,
the dismissal of the supplemental claims can also happen at any time in
the suit. 263 However, if these claims are dismissed after substantial
pretrial proceedings have occurred for non-jurisdictional purposes, any
dismissal will thwart the purposes of the supplemental jurisdiction
statute: to promote efficiency and fairness of trials. 264 Therefore,
Congress has two options: (1) take all discretion away from courts after
the suit begins; or (2) add a timing element to the revised statute. 265
Taking away all discretion from federal courts after the suit begins
would make this dismissal factor equivalent to the other three dismissal
factors because the district court could only use the factor to dismiss

2The Note's contribution is in italicized text. The text in regular font is taken from the
existing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(2) and (4).
259
See supra note 103 for the current text of § 1367(c)(1)-(2) and (4).
260

See supra Part III.B.

See supra Part III.B. Section 1367(a) states that a federal court shall hear all claims that
are so related to the anchor claim that the supplemental claims form part of the same case
or controversy. This mandate of jurisdiction creates a strong presumption that district
courts should maintain supplemental jurisdiction. If the dismissal inquiry is performed
after the suit has begun, then the timing of the inquiry becomes a significant factor. The
use of any of the discretionary dismissal factors discussed in this Section after a suit has
begun will be adverse to the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.
Therefore, when district courts use the discretionary dismissal factors in this Section, the
inquiry can only take place at the beginning of the suit. The word "initially" was added
into the proposed revision of § 1367(c)(1)-(2) and (4) to make this principle textually clear.
262
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
263
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
261

264

See supra Part III.C.2.

265

See supra Part III.C (discussing the need for a timing element for § 1367(c)(3)).
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claims at the beginning of the suit.266 As a result, a timing element
would not be necessary for § 1367(c)(3), but such a rule could lead to
abuse. Plaintiffs' attorneys would be given a powerful tool to have their
state-law claims heard in federal court when the anchor claim is not
dismissed at the beginning of the suit, but shortly afterwards.
Therefore, Congress should add a timing element to the revised
statute. 267 The dividing line should be whether the anchor claim is
dismissed before or after substantial pretrial proceedings have
occurred. 268 If the dismissal of the anchor claim is before such event,
then the presumption to maintain jurisdiction from § 1367(a) should be
reversed. 269 Thus, the court must decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction when the parties have not invested in substantial pretrial
proceedings and there is an alternate forum where the plaintiff can assert
270
its supplemental claims.
There are two ways that Congress can address the problem of a
plaintiff not having an alternate forum upon dismissal. First, Congress
can use the lack of an alternate forum as a factor that would create a
presumption to maintain jurisdiction. 271 However, such a factor will
likely be viewed by the Court as too broad to clearly abrogate the state's

266 See supra Part W.A.
267 See supra Part III.C.1-2.
268 When a federal court determines whether "substantial pretrial proceedings" have

taken place the court should rely upon Rule I of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
cases interpreting this rule. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in
all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity
or in admiralty, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of even action.
Id. (emphasis added); see Kenney v. Cal. Tanker Co., 381 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1967) (holding
that the district courts have the responsibility to secure the just and speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action); see also Bell v. Swift & Co., 283 F.2d 407 (5th
Cir. 1960) (noting that Rule 1 is in the interest of the administration of justice and
transcends in importance of mere inconvenience to a party litigant); Canister Co. v. Leahy,
182 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1950) (noting that Rule 1 must be adhered to); United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 67 F. Supp. 397 (D.C. 1946) (holding that a court should dispose of the case at
first opportunity which is appropriate under these rules and in accord with rights of the
parties).
269

See supra Part III.C.1.

270 See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
271 See supra Part Ill.C.2, D.
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Eleventh Amendment immunity. 272 The second way that Congress can
address this problem is to revise § 1367(d) so that it will apply to all
claims, namely, § 1367(d) will apply to states that have consented to
273
being sued in their state courts.
If dismissal of the anchor claim happens after substantial pretrial
proceedings have occurred, then the federal court should have discretion
about whether to dismiss the remaining state-law claims that do not
have an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. 274 However, this
discretion should not be unfettered. 275 Section 1367(a) creates a strong
presumption for federal courts to maintain jurisdiction of certain
claims. 276 In addition, when substantial pretrial proceedings have
occurred, dismissal can be an inefficient use of judicial resources and
create unfairness to the parties. 277 Therefore, the district courts should
only exercise their discretion to dismiss the claims if: (1) an alternate
forum for the plaintiff to have its supplemental claims heard exists; (2)
the dismissal will not substantially interfere with the judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity of the parties; and (3) specific findings
regarding the reason(s) for dismissal or remand are made. 278 Section
1367(c) (3)-now proposed as a separate subsection: § 1367(d) - should
be revised to read:
(d) If the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction (1) before substantialpretrial proceedings have occurred,
then the district court must decline to maintain

272 See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text. The Court in Raygor stated that a clear
statement of congressional intent to abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
was needed. Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 544 (2002); see also supra
note 239 and accompanying text. Therefore, an alternate forum's availability may not be
sufficient to clearly show Congress' intention to abrogate a state's immunity. However,
this factor will provide the federal courts with a textual factor that they should consider
before dismissing claims.
273 See supra Part III.D.
274 See supra Part III.C.2.

275 See supra text accompanying note 140.
276 See supra text accompanying note 178.
277

See supra Part III.C.2.

278 See supra Part III.C.1-3. Specific findings regarding the reason(s) for dismissal will
create a record that will be more easily reviewable by the appellate courts should a party
appeal on the grounds of judicial abuse of discretion. See supra notes 219-21 and
accompanying text.
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supplemental jurisdiction, if an adequate alternate
279
forum exists.
(2) after substantial pretrial proceedings have occurred,
then the district court may decline to maintain
supplementaljurisdictiononly if(i) an adequatealternateforum exists,
(ii) the dismissalwill not substantiallyinterfere with
the judicial economy, convenience, fairness, or
comity of the parties, and
(iii) specific findings regarding the reason(s) for
dismissal or remand are made.28°
By making the timing of the inquiry a factor, Congress will be able to
specifically state its intention to switch the presumption of whether
supplemental jurisdiction should be maintained in the text of the
statute. 281 Therefore, federal courts will have clear boundaries of when
282
they should use their discretion to dismiss the supplemental claims.
Furthermore, this revision clearly states what factors the federal courts
283
should consider when conducting this inquiry.
The revision of the current version of § 1367(c)(3) will ensure that
plaintiffs like Raygor will have an opportunity to have their claims
heard. 284 First, the discretion to dismiss is tightened by clearly stating

279

See supra text accompanying note 273.

This factor for dismissal may not fill the

jurisdictional gap that the Court exposed in Raygor. Therefore, Congress should revise
§ 1367(d). See supra Part III.D.
28O The Note's contribution is in italicized text. The text in regular font is taken from the
existing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
281

282

See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.1-2.

See supra text accompanying note 281.
See supra Part I. With the proposed statute, a federal court should not dismiss
Raygor's supplemental claim unless he was allowed to use the state courts of Minnesota to
assert his MHRA claim. If an adequate alternate forum did exist, then the federal court
may exercise its discretion to dismiss or remand the supplemental claims. If the federal
court chooses to dismiss or remand Raygor's supplemental claim, then the court would be
required to state the reasons why the dismissal or remand would be in the interest of
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, or comity of the parties. The specific findings
regarding the reasons for dismissal or remand would create a record that will more easily
be reviewable by the appellate courts.
283

284
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the appropriate presumption. 2 5 Second, requesting specific findings will
not further burden the federal judges because they must already go
through the discretionary analysis.2 6 Further, if specific findings are
287
made, then the appellate courts will have a record for easier review.
Thus, appellate courts would be able to determine whether an abuse of
discretion existed in Raygor's situation. Third, the requirement of the
existence of an alternate forum will provide plaintiffs like Raygor an
2
argument that dismissing their claim would create a great injustice. 8
This injustice would be analogous to dismissing a claim on forum non
conveniens grounds when an adequate alternate forum does not exist.28 9
C. Revision of§ 1367(d)
The current version of § 1367(d) is sufficient for most purposes. 2
However, the Court has recently taken an active role to protect state's
sovereign immunity and has stated that the current language of
§ 1367(d) does not, in fact, apply to all claims. 291 Specifically, the statute
does not toll the state statute of limitations for claims filed in federal
292
court where the state has consented to being sued in their courts.
Since this limitation has created unfairness to litigants and an inefficient
use of judicial resources, Congress should amend the current version of
§ 1367(d) so that the tolling provision clearly and unambiguously applies
to every claim, even claims against states filed in federal court, where the
state has consented to being sued in its courts. 293 Section 1367(d) -now
proposed as § 1367(e) -should be revised to read:
(e) The period of limitations shall be tolled while the
claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it
is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer
tolling period for any -

25
See supra Part III.C.1-2. Before substantial pretrial proceedings have occurred, the
presumption should be that the federal court declines to maintain supplemental
jurisdiction. After substantial pretrial proceedings have occurred, the presumption shifts.
The presumption at this time in the suit is that a court should maintain supplemental
jurisdiction unless the listed factors are met.
2M See supra text accompanying notes 219-21.
7 See supra text accompanying notes 219-21.
2
See supra text accompanying note 271.
289 See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
I9" See supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
292 See Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 542 (2002).
293

See supra Part III.D.
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(1) claim asserted under subsection (a),
(2) claim against States filed in federal court where the
State has consented to being sued in its courts,294 and
(3) other claim in the same action that is voluntarily
dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of
the claim under subsection (a).295
This revision will clearly and unambiguously abrogate the state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity when a claim is properly brought under
the supplemental jurisdiction statute and the state has consented to
being sued in its courts. 296 This revision in the statute will serve two
purposes. First, this revision will allow plaintiffs like Raygor an
alternate forum where they can have their discrimination claim heard
after it is dismissed from federal court. 297 Second, by clearly abrogating
the state's immunity, this revision will provide the Supreme Court the
opportunity to determine whether Congress has the power to abrogate
the state's immunity in this specific procedural circumstance or if there
will always be a hole in the supplemental jurisdiction statute which will
298
create injustice to plaintiffs such as Raygor.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Finley, the Supreme Court sent a message to Congress that the
federal courts needed congressional authorization to assert jurisdiction
over pendent and ancillary claims. Congress responded to the injustice

This clear and unambiguous statement will clearly provide congressional intent to
abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity in this specific procedural issue.
Therefore, Raygor's problem will be solved because the statute of limitations in Minnesota
state forum will be tolled while he is pursuing his ADEA and supplemental MHRA claim
in the federal forum.
295 The Note's contribution is in italicized text. The text in regular font is taken from the
existing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).
26 See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
297 See supra text accompanying notes 273, 295.
298 See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text. When a federal court is determining
whether a statute abrogates a state's sovereign immunity, the court will first determine
whether Congress has clearly and unambiguously stated its intent to abrogate. Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996). This proposed revision of the statute will
satisfy Seminole Tribe's first requirement. Only after Congress unequivocally expresses its
intent to abrogate will the federal courts determine whether Congress had the power to do
Therefore, this proposed revision will allow the federal courts to make this
so.
determination.
294
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in Finley with the supplemental jurisdiction statute. Since the passage of
this statute, courts have inconsistently used their discretion to dismiss
claims asserted under § 1367(c), especially § 1367(c)(3). The discretion
given by § 1367(c)(3) presently hinges on the timing of the dismissal of
the anchor claim. Since Congress did not define this timing line, courts
have been inconsistent in its application. Recently, the Court sent a
message to Congress that the tolling provision in § 1367(d) will not be
sufficient for claims against states filed in federal court where the state
has consented to being sued in their courts unless Congress clearly and
unambiguously states its intention to do so.
The proposed revision of § 1367(c)-(d) tightens the discretion in
§ 1367(c) by specifically stating the appropriate presumption of whether
federal courts should use their discretion to dismiss a supplemental
claim. Since federal courts can use § 1367(c)(3) at any time in the suit, the
proposed revision ties the presumption of when a federal court can
dismiss the remaining supplemental claims to a timing factor of whether
the anchor claim was dismissed before or after substantial pretrial
proceeding have occurred. Finally, this proposed revision offers two
ways that Congress can address the hole that Raygor exposed in
§ 1367(d). With the proposed revision, plaintiffs such as Raygor will
have a forum in which they can have their claims heard. Federal courts
will know the appropriate presumption for whether to maintain
jurisdiction over all supplemental claims. Furthermore, upon dismissal
of a supplemental claim after the anchor claim was dismissed, appellate
courts will have a record upon which they can assess whether the district
court abused its discretion when dismissing the supplemental claims.
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